From
78 American Journal of International Law, 253, January
1984, 78.
Review by John F. Murphy, Villanova University
Benjamin Ferencz
is a phenomenon. In addition to being the author of two-volume
treatises on Defining International Aggression (1975)
and An International Criminal Court (1980), [1] as well as of the much praised Less
Than Slaves (1979),
[2] he maintains a busy international law practice
and engages in ceaseless efforts, at the United Nations and in
other forums, to promote humanitarian norms for international
law.
Now Ferencz has turned his considerable energies to an ambitious
task: a review of efforts to enforce international law as a way
towards world peace. In his latest work, Ferencz's focus is more
narrow than that taken by Roger Fisher, who has recently written
extensively on the general problem of implementing international
law. [3] By
contrast, Ferencz's emphasis is on a review and evaluation of
efforts to implement international law and processes designed
to maintain international peace and security.
Ferencz's historical survey includes chapters on, inter alia,
"The Origins of International Law Enforcement" (ch.
1); "Enforcement Views of Classical Scholars" (ch. 2);
"The 'Grand Designs' for International Law Enforcement"
(ch. 3); "Enforcement by Codes and Courts" (ch. 4);
"Enforcement Plans After World War I" (ch. 5); "Enforcement
in Practice After World War I" (ch. 7); "Enforcement
Proposals by Post-War Planners" (ch. 9); "Enforcement
in Practice After World War II" (ch. 11); and "Enforcement
by Non-Military Means" (ch. 13). Throughout these and his
other chapters, there are references to documents relating to
efforts to maintain international peace and security that Ferencz
has collected in documentary supplements to each volume. These
documents, along with the bibliographies contained at the end
of both volumes of his work, should prove invaluable as a reference
source for scholars.
In his survey, Ferencz covers the law and practice regarding both
jus ad bellum and jus in bello. Accordingly, he
discusses and summarizes the law of armed conflict as well as
efforts to prevent the use of armed force to settle disputes.
In both of these areas, Ferencz explores the works of classical
scholars and the attempts by statesmen to put their ideas into
practice.
In these writings and state practice, Ferencz has uncovered some
fascinating pieces of information. For example, Ferencz reports
that the Abbe de St. Pierre, writing in the early 18th century,
proposed, as an enforcement measure for his plan for world peace,
that "[a]ny sovereign who broke the peace of the Union could
be punished, together with 200 of his principal ministers, by
death or life imprisonment" (vol. I, p. 22). Over 200 years
later, the Abbe's suggestion was effectively adopted by the tribunal
at Nuremberg.
Similarly, Ferencz notes that David Dudley Field's book, Draft
Outlines of an International Code, published in 1872, contained
a provision that, in the case of grave crimes against international
law such as piracy, extradition would be mandatory if requested
by a nation "whose penal system offers guarantees of impartiality
and humanity" (quoted in vol. I at p. 31). The approach of
the world community in respect of hijacking, by contrast, has
been to resist mandatory extradition (favored by the Soviet bloc
countries) and to settle instead on an "extradite or submit
to prosecution" formula.
In volume II, at page 444, Ferencz reminds us of how close the
United States and the Soviet Union came to agreeing on the formation
of armed forces to be placed at the disposal of the Security Council
as prescribed by Article 43 of the Charter. One may speculate
what use would have been made of such an armed force had it been
established.
At page 447 of his second volume, Ferencz notes the success of
the Security Council in helping to restore peace with a minimum
of bloodshed between the Netherlands and Indonesia when their
conflict broke out in 1947. He suggests that the Council achieved
this success by
1) calling for an immediate cease-fire as soon as new hostilities
erupted, 2) urging the parties to settle differences by peaceful
means, 3) obtaining objective reports from independent consular
observers, 4) offering good offices through a committee chosen
by the parties themselves, 5) monitoring the situation closely
and 6) by not allowing the dispute to disappear from the U.N.
agenda until a peaceful settlement was reached.
Unfortunately, one or more of these factors have been missing
from most recent efforts by the Security Council to maintain international
peace and security.
In light of the current situation in Central America, Ferencz's
brief discussion of the 1965 U.S. intervention in the Dominican
Republic is of interest. Roundly criticized by international law
scholars as an illegal unilateral use of armed force by the United
States, the long-term effect of the intervention in the Dominican
Republic appears to be favorable, as democracy is in place in
that country, and a Communist regime has not taken power. With
regard to the legal aspects, Ferencz notes that in response to
Soviet contentions that only the Security Council could authorize
enforcement action, an analysis prepared by Malaysia at the time
argued that regional intervention was justified as a humanitarian
act to give the parties time for peaceful reconciliation through
democratic institutions (vol. II, p. 458).
In his comment on the dispute over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands,
Ferencz points out that the issue of sovereignty over the islands
"remains on the agenda of the United Nations as a continuing
challenge to the peaceful enforcement of international law"
(vol. II, p. 461). Contributing to the challenge is the current
adamant refusal of the British Government to submit that issue
to third-party dispute settlement and its insistence instead that
British sovereignty over the islands cannot be questioned.
At page 463 of his second volume, Ferencz notes, with respect
to the war in Vietnam, that "[a]s for the punishment of aggression
and crimes against humanity, the world forgot the lessons of Nuremberg."
Sadly, from the end of the Vietnam War to the present time, the
Nuremberg principles have been more honored in the breach than
in the observance.
In a relatively brief section (ch. 14 and an afterword, vol. I,
pp. 479-94), Ferencz sets forth his suggestions for "Making
Enforcement More Enforceable." Reasonable persons can differ
over these. For example, at pages 479-81, Ferencz appears to place
a great deal of faith in the drafting of new declarations or the
conclusion of new treaties and conventions designed to maintain
international peace and security. He cites, as an example of past
success, the definition of aggression reached by consensus of
the General Assembly in 1974. For his part, this reviewer agrees
with the prediction of President Truman that attempting to define
aggression would be "a trap for the innocent and an invitation
to the guilty."
[4] Unfortunately, despite the relative success of
the drafting effort on the Friendly Relations Declaration, attempts
at this time to revise the UN Charter or to conclude new codes
against aggression or the threat or use of armed force are more
likely to create loopholes for those inclined to settle disputes
through the use of armed force than they are to close them.
Ferencz also calls for the strengthening of third-party dispute
settlement, most particularly, greater use of the International
Court of Justice, as a step towards world peace. There is little
doubt that greater use of third-party settlement, including the
World Court, would be desirable. However, one should not place
too much reliance on international judicial settlement as a means
of maintaining international peace and security. The Security
Council of the United Nations, the Secretary-General, and mediation
efforts inside and outside international institutions are likely
to be more effective instruments for keeping the peace than international
courts.
More generally, Ferencz places too much emphasis on the enforcement
of international law in respect to the maintenance of international
peace and security. As Inis Claude has pointed out, collective
security as an approach to peace is difficult to carry out in
practice even among allies. Claude has questioned the general
desirability of collective security on the ground that it ignores
"the infinite variety of circumstances, the flux of contingency,
the mutability of situations," and that it constitutes an
abdication of "the function of applying statesmanlike rationality
to problems as they arise." [5]
The wisdom of these remarks is demonstrated by the
current world situation where confrontation between states is
rampant and the application of "statesmanlike rationality
to problems" is rare.
In conclusion, although Ferencz's emphasis on coercive measures
for the implementation of international law relating to the maintenance
of international peace and security may not be wholly convincing,
his two-volume work is a valuable and timely addition to the literature
in the field. At a time when international lawyers have largely
turned their attention away from the critical issue of world peace
towards more technical matters, these two volumes, with their
wealth of historical documentary material, serve to remind us
that the maintenance of international peace and security is still
the paramount challenge facing international law today.